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Abstract 
Gender-specific determinants of remittances are the subject of this study based on German SOEP 
data (2001-2006). In 2007, about 7.3 million foreigners were living in Germany. While the total 
number of foreigners has decreased over the last decade, female migration to Germany has 
increased. A feminization of migration is observable all over the world, and is changing gender 
roles in the households of origin as well. Today, women constitute 48.6% of migratory flows to 
Germany, although the proportion varies significantly by country of origin. A feminization of 
migration is observable all over the world, and is changing gender roles in the households of 
origin as well. 
 
To date, research has failed to address the gender-specific determinants of remittances from 
Germany. Here we attempt to fill this gap, focusing on gender roles and network effects. We 
distinguish between three different groups of migrants: foreigners, Germans with migration 
background, and all individuals with personal migration experience. Our main findings show, 
above all, that gender matters. However, the gender differences identified disappear after 
controlling for transnational (family) networks. Taking interaction terms into account reveals 
gender-specific network effects. In addition, different groups of migrants show remarkable 
differences in international networking. We find that female foreigners, but not female migrants 
with German citizenship, remit less than males if their children live abroad as well. Female 
migrants with German citizenship send more money home if their siblings remain in the home 
country. We find the reverse in the case of female migrants with foreign citizenship.  
 
Our findings show that female migrants tend to support their children first and foremost, while 
male migrants tend to support a wider network of more distant family members and friends. This 
finding is in sharp contrast to previous studies on remittances. It makes clear that there is little 
evidence supporting the assumption that remittances simply follow income-difference based 
altruism or that women are more altruistic than men. Furthermore, there seems to be evidence 
that the gender-specific differences detected in remittance behavior might be due to gender-
specific migration patterns and the relative role of the migrant within the transnational network. 
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  11 Introduction 
 
In 2007, about 7.3 million foreigners were living in Germany. While the total number of 
foreigners has decreased over the last decade, female migration to Germany has increased. 
Today, women make up 48.6% of the migratory flows to Germany, though the proportion varies 
significantly by country of origin (Federal Statistical Office 2008). A feminization of migration is 
observable all over the world and is changing gender roles in the households of origin as well 
(Ramirez 2005). Of course, both male and female migrants send money home. From a global 
perspective, these remittances are considered the driving force behind migration and indicate the 
existence of transnational private networks and transnational family life (Guarnizo 2003; The 
World Bank 2005). Worldwide remittances are increasing. In 2007, remittances from Germany 
amounted to more than twelve billion US dollars, making Germany one of the top five source 
countries for this kind of cross-border transfers (The World Bank 2008).   
From a theoretical perspective, remittances are usually analyzed from the angle of international 
labor economics and in the context of the economics of migration. Seminal work was done by 
Lucas and Stark (Lucas/Stark 1985; Stark 1995), who analyze altruism-driven remittances and 
explained this phenomenon in the context of the new economics of labor migration (NELM). 
More recent models assume that migration and remittances offer the possibility for portfolio 
diversification and insurance against income uncertainty (Rosenzweig 1988; Poirine 1997; 
Foster/Rosenzweig 2001). One common prediction of all these approaches is that remittances will 
decline over time – a finding that is in sharp contrast to many studies based on macro-data. 
Furthermore, gender-specific patterns of migration have been neglected in the theoretical 
literature on remittances to date. This might be due partly to the focus on labor migration, in 
combination with the assumption that most migrant workers are men, and that women are their 
dependents. In redressing this analytical imbalance, several empirical studies emerged since 
taking gender as a central dimension of social structure and economic decision-making (Portes 
1997; Pessar/Mahler 2003; Sørenson 2005; Ramirez/Dominguez/Morais 2005; Orozco/Lowell/ 
Schneider 2006). However, the results are not clear-cut when studying different countries and 
different data sets.  
A study that addresses the gender-specific determinants of remittances from Germany is still 
lacking. One common finding of the existing papers on remittances from Germany is that females 
remit less than males (Merkle/Zimmermann 1992; Oser 1995; Holst/Schrooten 2006; Holst/ 
  2Schaefer/Schrooten 2008). Studies analyzing remittances in the context of savings support this 
view (Sinning 2007). However, pooling men and women in the estimation can be justified only if 
the crucial explanatory variables indeed do not vary by sex.
1  
Here and in contrast to earlier studies, we check this assumption empirically. In doing so, our 
paper fills at least three analytical gaps. First, we show that gender-specific determinants of 
remittances exist. Second, we analyze the importance of private networks abroad for gender-
specific patterns of remittances. Third, we investigate whether different groups of migrants such 
as foreigners and Germans with a migration background vary in their remittance decisions. The 
analysis is based on data provided by the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). We pooled 
data from the years 2001-2006.
2  In this survey, participants answer a broad range of questions 
concerning their socio-economic status, demographic characteristics, as well as integration into 
country of destination and family and friends networks in both host and home country. We are 
thus able to exploit information not only on the recent social status of the migrant in the host 
country but also on the existing networks in the home country.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some insights into the determinants of 
remittances and networks from a theoretical point of view. In Section 3, the data set, the general 
estimation approach, and the variables employed are explained. The results of the econometric 
models are discussed in Section 4. The conclusions (Section 5) present not only policy 
recommendations but also potentially fruitful directions for further research. 
 
 
2 Remittances: Networks, Transnationalism, and Gender – The Theoretical Background 
 
Seminal work on remittances was done by Lucas and Stark (1985). Their basic microeconomic 
model relies on altruism. With altruism, the utility function of the migrant depends not only on 
her own consumption, but also on the utility of the relatives left behind (Lucas/Stark 1985; Stark 
1995). Their utility is a function of consumption, which depends on the income either generated 
at home or received in the form of remittances, as well as their degree of altruism. Important 
                                                 
1 Technically speaking, when controlling for sex using a dummy variable, all coefficients are assumed to 
be the same for men and women.  
2 See SOEP (2001).  
  3implications are that transfers cannot increase with the recipient’s income and will decrease over 
time.
3  
A second class of models emphasizes the family of the migrant as the important decision-making 
unit. Within this context, migration and remittances are considered to result from social 
interactions. The most important approaches take insurance or investment motives into account 
(see for overview Rapoport/Docquier 2005). Within this framework, the existence of an intra-
family contract, either to reduce uncertainty or finance investment, is assumed. Usually the 
decision-making processes are analyzed within a two-member family living for two periods. For 
each member, the income I
1 is given in period 1, the income in period 2 is random and amounts 
to I
h with probability p and  
h
I  with probability (1-p). It is assumed that I
h < 
h
I . This framework 
allows the formulation of a function of expected utility E(V), which depends not only on the 
income and the probability to realize a certain income but also on the degree of risk aversion ν   
with ν '> 0,ν ''< 0 
 
(3) E(V ) = I 
1 + p ν (I
h) + (1− p)*ν* (
h
I ) . 
 
It is assumed that migration reduces income uncertainty. However, migration-specific transaction 
costs (t) have to be covered. These costs are high and range between  
 
(4) I
1 < t < 2* I
1. 
 
The existence of these costs requires financing from larger kinship networks (the “extended or 
transnational family”). Since these migration costs have to be shared by the potential migrant and 
the non-migrant, there exists a set of Pareto-efficient contracts that have to fulfill the following 
condition 
 
(5) Max E(V 
m ) + λ [E(V 
h)− V 
h ]. 
                                                 
3 Other models focusing on the individual utility function of the migrant underscore the argument of 
payment for services at home (exchange) or strategic behavior. While the exchange argument is covered 
relatively well by the standard model – the amount of remittances increases with increasing demand for 
services at home – arguments based on strategic behavior require a more sophisticated approach. The 
general assumption that migrants compensate non-migrants for staying at home is interesting (Stark 1995; 
Stark/Wang 2002). 
  4 
Important factors are the share of migration costs covered by the migrant and λ, the relative 
bargaining power of the non-migrant. In general, these kinds of models consider the family to 
reduce uncertainty and therefore to be a substitute for a smoothly functioning insurance and 
financial sector in the remitter’s home country. Models relying on the investment motive argue 
that migration costs related to the creation of human capital and education are covered by the 
family through an intra-family loan (Poirine 1997). Within such framework, better educated 
migrants transfer more than low-skilled migrants because of their more demanding 
responsibilities.
4 Models using the insurance motive point out that the risks at home and the risks 
in the foreign country are not correlated.
5 
These theoretical models are usually tested empirically by checking for the explanatory power of 
the age of the migrant, education, the length of the stay abroad, the migrant’s income, and the 
household size in the host country.
6 According to the theoretical models relying on insurance and 
investment, there is no reason for a decrease of remittances with the length of stay. In addition, 
better education should lead to higher remittances. Remittances out of investments and insurance 
are expected to be more likely and higher as the distance from the family increases.
7 However, 
the theoretical approaches presented above neglect the importance of structure of the 
transnational (family) network. Nevertheless, there seems to be evidence that these network 
effects matter (Sana/Massey 2005). Within the theoretical framework presented above, migration 
costs play a critical role and these transaction costs have been treated as exogenous. It is known 
from the huge body of sociological literature that migration costs tend to decrease with the size of 
the relevant network of migrants in the destination country. In addition, recent approaches argue 
that only a small proportion of migrants settle permanently in the destination country assimilate 
                                                 
4 In practice, of course, the strength of personal ties between the remitter and the recipient also plays a 
major role within the altruism model, as VanWey (2004) indicates. Galor and Stark (1990) demonstrate 
that the positive probability of immigrants to return to their home countries positively affect remittances 
(see also Rapoport/Docquier 2005 for a review).  
5 Migration and remittances are considered to be a component of intra-family allocation decisions, mainly 
compensating for weaknesses in the domestic social security system and financial sector. 
6 In practice, however, it can be assumed that remittances are not driven by a single motive. Some recent 
theoretical models therefore combine different motives, for example, altruism and insurance 
(Foster/Rosenzweig 2001). Nevertheless, these models often suffer from the fact that the different motives 
cannot be discriminated completely. Furthermore, remittances made out of altruistic motives might induce 
“spillover effects”, given that some services or investment opportunities are offered specifically to 
migrants. 
7 The theoretical literature draws no differentiation between the probability to remit and the amount 
remitted. 
  5into the new culture (Lucassen 2006; Morawska 2002). Furthermore, a great deal of migration is 
circular (Constant/Zimmermann 2007). Transnationalism – with respect to migration – refers 
from our perspective to migrants who are constantly involved in cross-border economic, socio-
cultural, and political activities (Bash 1994). Thus, relations between the destination country and 
home country are forged and sustained to maintain ties or cope with experiences in country of 
destination, however differently for men and women (Itzigsohn/Giorguli-Saucedo 2005). 
 
Until now the link between transnational activities – such as remittances – integration and private 
network relations has inspired very few theoretical works (Feist 2000; Morawska 2002). In 
particular, the analysis of the linkages between networks, migration, remittances, and gender 
roles is a fairly new branch of the research (Ramirez 2005). However, it becomes clear that 
migration and remittances have an important impact on economic and social life not only in the 
host country but also in the home country. Consequently, to analyze the determinants of 
remittances one must take into account the structural and personal characteristics of the migrants 
themselves, and their households (social interaction) in both the host and the home country 
(Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Dimension of Social Integration and Determinants of Remittances 
Dimension Determinants 
… at origin  Family and Friends Network: 
(grand)parents, children, siblings, further 
relatives, friends  
Social 
(Interaction) 
… at destination  Householdsize in Germany 
Marital Status 
Structural (Placement in destination country)  Individual Income 
Family Income 
Education  
Personal (Identification with destination country)  Remigration Plans  
Relative Duration of Stay 
Source: authors’ based on Esser (2001:16)  
 
The distribution of economic power within a family can also change with female migration. In 
this context it can be argued that gender is a central dimension of the structure of transnational 




  6Figure 1: Gender, Networks and Remittances  
 
Source: Ramirez (2005:23). 
 
It starts with the fact that female migrants are increasingly considered as a part of the labor 
market in the host country, which is usually a highly developed economy. This labor market 
participation leads to changes in gender roles and affects the structure of social nets and the 
distribution of economic power within the family of the migrant. Again, these changes have a 
considerable impact on the economic life in the home country of the migrant. If migration 
becomes more attractive to women, the relative (economic) position of the women in the home 
country changes. The gender dimension enters the equation due to the fact that the relative 
position of the migrant might determine her responsibilities within a given family network. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be empirical evidence that females are comparably risk adverse 
(Grazier/Sloane 2006). They are willing to change money for security and stability, an argument 
which was already used in the early 1950s to explain wage differences between men and women 
(Friedman 1953). Within a given transnational family network, females were thought to support 
those network structures that appeared to offer a high degree of security and to reduce risks. 
  73 Data and Econometric Approach  
 
The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) provides data on private households and 
individuals. In our analysis, we use data from the years 2001-2006 (study time 2000 to 2005) on 
the individual level. In this survey, participants answer a broad range of questions concerning 
their socio-economic status, demographic characteristics as well as on their integration into 
German society. In addition, they provide information on family and friend networks in both the 
host and the home country. For those born outside of Germany and those without German 
citizenship, we obtain valid information on their network outside of Germany (relatives in the 
home country) with the question “Do you have close relatives who do not live in Germany?”. In 
our estimation, this information is captured in dummy variables stating whether or not one has 
relatives of an older generation (parents/grandparents), younger generation (children), the same 
generation (siblings), or other relatives or non-relatives living abroad. 
In our case, the dependent variable is the natural log of the annual “amount of remittances”. 
Remittances are measured and for data from 2001 converted in euro.
8 Since we focus on the 
determinants of the amount of remittances, which are defined as individual cross-border transfers 
by foreigners or migrants, the retrospective question in the SOEP questionnaire is crucial: “Have 
you personally provided payments or support during the last year (2001) to relatives or other 
persons outside of your household? How much in the year as a whole? Where does the recipient 
live? Germany – Abroad”?
  9 All participants have to state whether they transferred money to 
their (step)parents, (step)children, (ex)spouse, or other relatives or non-relatives. In case of non-
payment, they could check the box: “No, I have not given any payment or support”. We thus 
obtain individual information, not only on the frequency of transfers to certain people but also on 
the amount transferred. 
Cross-border transfers to relatives and friends living in the home country are not only made by 
foreigners: many Germans with personal migration experience send money back to their country 
of origin as well. Fortunately, the structure of the SOEP data set enables us to differentiate 
between foreigners and naturalized migrants (Holst/Schrooten 2006).
10 Therefore we distinguish 
                                                 
8  The exchange rate for one Euro was 1.95585 DM. 
9 For details see: http://www.diw.de/deutsch/sop/service. 
10 However, we do not take into consideration migration within Germany (from East to West or opposite) 
and do not consider the migration status of other household members (household migration context)  
 
  8between the broader group of migrants, i.e., people with a personal migration experience and 
Germans with migration background, the narrower group of Germans with migration background 
and foreigners (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2: Migrants, Foreigners and Germans with Migration Background 
 
Foreigners 





We expect that foreigners and German migrants have different remittance patterns due to their 
different integration and status in Germany. Analyzing solely the remittance behavior of the 
broad group of migrants would not enable us to disentangle these effects. Table 2 provides some 
basic information about the average remittances sent.  
 
Table 2: The Amount of Remittances in Euro (annually), 2001-2006  










Year  Mean  Median   Mean   Median   Mean  Median   Mean   Median  
2001  1 066  767  1 456  1 022  1 247  1 022  1 565  1 022 
2002  1 340  675  1 631  1 000  1 656  1 000  2 127  1 000 
2003  1 469  800  1 612  1 000  1 750  1 000  1 866  1 200 
2004  1 458  750  1 662  1 000  1 737  1 000  2 004  1 500 
2005  1 423  625  2 010  1 000  1 690  1 000  2 362  1 000 
2006  1 529  500  2 331  1 000  1 705  950  3 234  1 500 
Note: persons older than 18 years living in private households; weighted mean 
Source: 2001-2006 SOEP, authors’ calculations 
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All in all, the average amount of remittances increased over time. This finding is totally in line 
with macro data on remittances. The highest growth was reached in the group of male foreigners. 
In 2006, the average amount remitted by this group was as twice as high as in 2001 and 
accounted for more than 3 200 euros. In general, foreigners remit more than migrants, which 
might be due to the higher pressure on them for return migration. This finding holds true for both 
women and men. In addition, gender-specific patterns are observable. In both groups, foreigners 
and migrants, women remit less than men. In 2006, the average amount remitted by foreign 
women accounted for only 50 percent of the average amount remitted by foreign men.  
 
To explain the determinants of the amount remitted, several standard explanatory variables are 
employed:  
Age: According to the theoretical literature, the age of the remitter plays a positive role. 
However, beyond a certain age, this tends to decline. This finding is reported in many empirical 
studies and often explained by the assumption that personal ties in the recipient countries become 
more distant with age. The variable “age squared” is used to control for these non-linearities. In 
accordance with the existing literature, we expect a positive sign of the variable age and a 
negative one in the case of the variable age squared.  
Gender: Many empirical studies report a significant influence of gender on the amount of 
remittances. While Lucas and Stark (1985) found in their seminal work on remittances that 
women show a higher probability to remit, more recent studies have produced the opposite 
finding. Here we use a dummy variable to check for the gender effect. The variable “gender” is 1 
in the case of a female remitter and 0 in the case of a male remitter. 
Marital status: Several empirical studies come to the conclusion that married migrants send 
larger amounts of remittances abroad (Merkle/Zimmermann 1992; Sinning 2007). Therefore we 
expect a positive sign of this dummy variable.   
Education: The value of the migrant’s human capital is reflected in years of education. 
According to theoretical models that rely on altruism as well as on intra-family-investment 
schemes, better education leads to higher transfers. Therefore a positive sign is expected here. 
Income: To capture the influence of the migrant’s income, we use monthly individual income 
data. In addition, we construct the net equivalent family income in subtracting the individual 
income from the household income, which should capture the income of other family members 
  10and make it easier to compare persons in households with different numbers of members. 
According to the theoretical literature, remittances increase with the migrant’s per capita income. 
This finding is reported in all microeconomic models. Therefore, we expect this variable to show 
a positive sign for the personal labor income of the migrant and foreigner.   
Household size in Germany: One important determinant of the amount of remittances is the 
household size of the migrant in the host country. The more members of the household live in 
Germany, the more Germany can be considered the locus of family life. Therefore, and in line 
with the theoretical models and empirical findings, we assume that the amount of remittances 
decrease with increasing numbers of members in the migrant’s household in Germany. 
Relative duration of stay: The variable “relative duration of stay” is constructed as “years in 
Germany divided by age” and reflects the influence of the years spent in Germany on 
remittances. The variable ranges between 0 and 1 and takes the value of 1 if the migrant has spent 
his or her entire lifetime in Germany. This variable can be taken as a proxy for the influence of 
the duration of the stay in Germany (relative to the age of the migrant). According to the 
construction of the variable, we expect a negative sign, which is in line with the findings from 
several previous empirical studies showing that remittances decrease with the length of the stay 
abroad.   
Remigration plans: In addition, the migrant’s plan for return migration may influence the 
decision on remittances. Fortunately the SOEP data enable us to check for this. We assume that 
personal remigration plans are strongly linked to social networks abroad. Remittances are one 
important tie between the social network in the home country and the migrant. Therefore we 
expect a positive sign in the case of future return migration plans. 
Social networks: In addition to these standard variables, we check for the existence of social 
networks in the home country. To analyze the network effects, we construct dummy variables for 
having (grand)parents, children, siblings, or other relatives or friends abroad. In line with the 
literature on remittances, we assume that in general the existence of social networks abroad will 
lead to higher remittances. Therefore we expect positive signs of all the network variables 
employed.    
 
After excluding all observations with missing values on one of the variables used in the analysis, 
the panel data set contains 10 440 observations in the case of migrants and 6 627 observations in 
the case of foreigners (2001-2006). Because not all immigrants remit, the data set contains many 
  11zeros. To deal with this issue, in analyzing the determinants of the amount of remittances we 
perform estimations of Tobit models, which enable us to analyze the determinants of the positive 
amount in relation to socio-economic variables. For all panel models, Hausman statistics were 
calculated to test the choice between random or fixed effects models. Although random effects 
models do not control for omitted characteristics of the individuals, our objective was to include 
stable covariates such as family network of the individual.  
 
 
4 Empirical Results  
  
The fact, that one person remits can be interpreted as an indicator of the existence of personal ties 
to the home country. As the descriptive statistic shows, about one-fifth of the migrants living in 
Germany send money home. What determines the amount of remittances? Here, we proceed in 
three steps. All the models are estimated separately for the broad group of migrants, for Germans 
with a migration background, and for foreigners (Tables 3, 4, 5). First, we estimate the “core” 
equation, which answers the question of how important the standard variables are in general.  In 
doing, so we check for the importance of the variable “gender” (Model a). Second, since we want 
to attain further insights into network effects and gender-specific differences in remittances, we 
estimate an extended equation (Model b).  In addition, we estimate Model b separately for males 
and females (Model c). Third, and foremost we introduce interaction terms and check for their 
explanatory power (Table 6).  
 
4.1 The Core Model  
Tables 3, 4, 5 present the results of the “core” model in all three cases: migrants, foreigners, and 
Germans with migration background (Column 1). Focusing on the broad group of migrants, our 
central findings are: female migrants remit significantly less than males. Remittances increase 
with the age of the migrant. However, this relationship is not linear. This is in accordance to the 
finding that with the duration of the stay, the amount remitted decreases significantly. Being 
married and plans for remigration lead to significantly higher remittances. The same holds true 
for higher personal income. Nevertheless, no significant influence of net household equivalent 
income on remittances is reported. In addition, better education leads to significantly higher 
remittances. All in all, the results reported support the view that remittances can be at least partly 
  12considered as a tool for international insurance and risk diversification. This is totally in line with 
the existing literature on remittances from Germany (Merkle/Zimmermann 1995; Oser 1995; 
Sinning 2007). 
Turning now to the subgroups of foreigners and Germans with a migration background, we find 
several differences in remittance behavior. While female foreigners remit significantly less than 
males, the variable “gender” has become insignificant in the case of Germans with a migration 
background. In addition, the household size in Germany has no significant effect on remittances 
of Germans with a migration background. In the case of foreigners, it becomes clear that there is 
no significant linkage between the level of education and the amount remitted.  
 
4.2 Network effects 
 
Now we check for the explanatory power of transnational (family) networks. Model b clearly 
reveals that networks are important for all three groups. However the effects of the different 
network variables on remittances vary widely between the three groups. Focusing on migrants, it 
becomes clear that having children, siblings, and friends abroad has a positive impact on the 
amount remitted (Table 3). Nevertheless, intergenerational transfers seem to go first and foremost 
to the younger generation. It appears noteworthy that after controlling for network effects, the 
gender variable becomes insignificant, indicating that the remittance decisions of men and 
women follow a similar structure. In addition, remigration plans are no longer significantly 
related to remittances. At first glance, there is little reason to assume that the gender-pooled 
estimation leads to misleading results. However, turning to Model c, which enables us to 
distinguish between the groups of women and men, we see that gender-specific differences in 
remittances do exist. Men and women send more money home if parents, grandparents, or 
children live abroad. Having friends living abroad indicates higher remittances only in the case of 
men. In contrast to earlier studies using a specific data set (Orozco/Lowell/Schneider 2006), there 
seems to be evidence that women’s remittances are concentrated on intergenerational transfers. In 
other words, men seem to have a wider network than women.  
Similar patterns can be detected in the case of foreigners (Table 4). Again, after checking for 
network effects, the variable gender becomes insignificant. However, within the set of variables 
on social networks only the variable “children abroad” shows a significantly positive impact on 
remittances. Model c reveals that women and men differ concerning their remittance behavior. 
  13While, men also seem to feel responsible for siblings and children abroad, women focus their 
remittances on children.  
Turning now to the group of Germans with a migration background (Table 5, Model b) it can be 
shown that having parents/grandparents, siblings or friends abroad leads to higher remittances. 
Focusing on the gender-specific aspects of remittances (Model c), it becomes clear that females 
remit more if parents/grandparents, siblings, or friends are living in the home country. In the case 
of men, significantly higher remittances are reported if parents/grandparents, children, or friends 
are living abroad. All in all, remittances seem to depend on the relative position of the migrant 
within the transnational family.     
 
4.3 What determines the gender-specific pattern of remittances?  
 
Do our findings for the two separated groups of women and men also mean that the amount 
remitted depends significantly on gender-specific patterns? To check for significant differences, 
we use interaction terms (Table 6). For the broad group of migrants, we see that if 
parents/grandparents or children are living abroad, females remit less than males. Only by 
looking at the two subgroups of foreigners and Germans with a migration background we can 
identify different social network effects on the amount of remittances. First we see for foreigners 
with remigration plans that women remit less than men, an effect that is not significant for the 
group of German migrants. Second, in the case of foreigners with children abroad, women remit 
significantly less than men. This effect is also not significant in the group of Germans with a 
migration background. Third, in the group of foreigners with siblings abroad, women remit less 
than men. Here we find that just the opposite is true for Germans with a migration background: 
women remit even more than men. In the estimation for the broad group of migrants, this effect 
was not significant because the effects of the subgroups canceled each other out. All in all, these 
findings indicate that the relative position of the migrant within the transnational family seems to 
play an important role for remittances.  
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Table 3:  Migrants, dependent variable: annual amount of remittances
1 
 












       - women-   - men - 
Age  0.407 0.259 0.305 0.234 
  (5.63)*** (3.31)*** (2.79)*** (2.04)** 
Age  Squared  -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (5.95)*** (3.59)*** (2.85)*** (2.39)** 
Gender  (Female=1)  -0.585 -0.278    
 (2.03)**  (0.83)     
Marital  Status  (Married=1)  2.269 2.143 2.182 2.293 
  (5.73)*** (4.80)*** (3.30)*** (3.47)*** 
Education  (in  Years)  0.195 0.345 0.293 0.385 
  (3.87)*** (5.84)*** (3.61)*** (4.32)*** 
Monthly Individual Labour Income
1  0.449 0.386 0.329 0.458 
  (9.10)*** (6.70)*** (4.36)*** (4.83)*** 
Monthly Net Equivalent Family Income
2    0.017 0.039 0.096 0.044 
  (0.44) (0.84) (1.07) (0.80) 
Householdsize  in  Germany  -0.612 -0.437 -0.562 -0.399 
  (5.76)*** (3.68)*** (3.17)*** (2.39)** 
Relative Duration of Stay (Years in Germany/  Age)  -7.395 -8.106 -8.964 -7.625 
  (11.24)***  (9.21)*** (7.14)*** (6.02)*** 
Remigration Plans (yes=1)  1288  0.015  -1097  0.904 
 (4.44)***  (0.04)  (1.87)*  (1.68)* 
Network Abroad     
(grand)Parents  Abroad  (yes=1)  1.345 1.172 1.554 
   (3.75)***  (2.32)**  (3.02)*** 
Children Abroad (yes=1)  4.056  2.008  5.310 
   (6.50)***  (1.98)**  (6.36)*** 
Siblings  Abroad  (yes=1)  1.312 1.371 1.317 
   (2.18)**  (1.54)  (1.61) 
Other Relatives Abroad (yes=1)  -0.810  -0.527  -0.889 
    (1.34) (0.60) (1.06) 
Friends  Abroad  (yes=1)  1.434 1.013 1.767 
   (2.57)**  (1.27)  (2.26)** 
Constant  -17.149 -16.044 -16.438 -16.494 
  (10.13)***  (8.95)*** (6.46)*** (6.37)*** 
Observations   10 440 6 311 3 327 2 984 
Persons  2 531 1 648  861 787 
Log Likelihood  -7 186 -4 544 -2 274 -2 258 
      
1 ln; 2 ln of monthly net equivalent family income minus individual’s income. 
Note: Spouse abroad: N<3. Variables not reported here are:  Imputation Flags for Individual Labor Income and Family 
Labor Income. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses;  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Source:SOEP, 2001-2006, authors’ calculations 
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Table 4: Foreigners, dependent variable: annual amount of remittances
1 
 











(c )  
       - women-  - men - 
Age  0.373 0.161 -0.005  0.426 
 (3.48)***  (1.17)  (0.03)  (1.92)* 
Age  Squared  -0.005 -0.003 -0.001  -0.006 
 (4.04)***  (1.86)*  (0.54)  (2.30)** 
Gender  (Female=1)  -0.889 -0.479    
 (2.24)**  (0.89)     
Marital Status (Married=1)  2.346  2.884  3.615  2.596 
  (4.27)*** (4.03)*** (3.11)***  (2.61)*** 
Education (in Years)  0.098  0.375  0.347  0.381 
 (1.42)  (4.18)***  (2.71)***  (2.90)*** 
Monthly Individual Labour Income
1  0.613 0.574 0.607  0.486 
  (9.20)*** (6.50)*** (5.07)***  (3.50)*** 
Monthly Net Equivalent Family Income
2  0.078 0.119 0.066  0.124 
 (1.50)  (1.71)*  (0.42)  (1.51) 
Householdsize  in  Germany  -1.099 -0.913 -1.035  -0.860 
  (7.14)*** (4.60)*** (3.54)***  (3.01)*** 
Relative Duration of Stay (Years in Germany/  Age)  -7.044 -6.629 -8.334  -5.349 
  (7.82)*** (5.04)*** (4.32)***  (2.85)*** 
Remigration Plans (yes=1) 1.096  -0.382  -1.756  0.678 
 (3.11)***  (0.78)  (2.33)**  (1.01) 
Network Abroad    
(Grand)Parents Abroad (yes=1)  0.371  -0.440  0.915 
   (0.64)  (0.52)  (1.11) 
Children Abroad (yes=1)  5.429  3.760  6.641 
   (6.40)***  (2.76)***  (5.79)*** 
Siblings Abroad (yes=1)  1.271  -1.017  3.751 
   (1.19)  (0.59)  (2.61)*** 
Other Relatives Abroad (yes=1)  -0.708  0.307  -0.840 
   (0.67)  (0.18)  (0.60) 
Friends Abroad (yes=1)  0.076  -0.463  -0.152 
   (0.08)  (0.35)  (0.11) 
Constant  -14.540 -13.230 -8.323  -19.785 
  (5.87)*** (4.33)*** (2.04)**  (4.10)*** 
Observations  6 627 2 929 1 519 1 410 
Persons   1 535  732 369  363 
Log Likelihood  -4 313 -2 072 -1 001 -1 057 
       
1 ln; 2 ln of monthly net equivalent family income minus individual’s income. 
Note: Spouse abroad: N<3. Control variables not reported here are: Imputation Flags for Individual Labor Income and Family 
Labor Income. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses;  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Source:SOEP, 2001-2006, authors’ calculations 
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Table 5: Migrants with German citizenship, dependent variable: annual amount of remittances
1  
 





(b)   
Network Model 
 
( c)  
      - women-   - men- 
Age 0.421  0.325  0.507  0.157 
 (4.26)***  (3.29)***  (3.44)***  (1.15) 
Age Squared  -0.004  -0.003  -0.005  -0.002 
 (4.16)***  (3.28)***  (3.30)***  (1.24) 
Gender (Female=1)  -0.462  -0.218     
 (1.09)  (0.50)     
Marital Status (Married=1)  2.374  1.861  1.818  1.957 
 (4.11)***  (3.18)***  (2.15)**  (2.16)** 
Education (in Years)  0.351  0.373  0.275  0.515 
 (4.49)***  (4.45)***  (2.42)**  (3.97)*** 
Monthly Individual Labour Income
1 0.189  0.206 0.102  0.364 
 (2.52)**  (2.64)***  (1.01)  (2.74)*** 
Monthly Net Equivalent Family Income
2 -0.071  -0.025  0.102  -0.061 
 (1.20)  (0.41)  (0.89)  (0.79) 
Householdsize in Germany  -0.061  -0.146  -0.259  -0.061 
 (0.41)  (0.93)  (1.08)  (0.29) 
Relative Duration of Stay (Years in 
Germany/ Age)  -7.199  -9.614  -8.905  -10.380 
 (6.72)***  (7.19)***  (4.92)***  (5.12)*** 
Remigration Plans (yes=1) 2.234  1.613  0.880  2.323 
 (3.23)***  (1.99)**  (0.74)  (2.02)** 
Network Abroad      
(Grand)Parents Abroad (yes=1)  2.267  2.009  2.567 
   (4.41)***  (2.75)***  (3.52)*** 
Children Abroad (yes=1)  1.558  0.317  2.413 
   (1.51)  (0.18)  (1.84)* 
Siblings Abroad (yes=1)  1.253  2.728  -0.254 
   (1.67)*  (2.54)**  (0.24) 
Other Relatives Abroad (yes=1)  -0.813  -0.599  -1.098 
   (1.09)  (0.55)  (1.04) 
Friends Abroad (yes=1)  2.091  1.885  2.254 
   (3.05)***  (1.88)*  (2.38)** 
Constant -19.920  -17.523  -21.557  -15.800 
 (8.38)***  (7.35)***  (5.95)***  (4.78)*** 
Observations  3 813 3 382 1 808 1 574 
Persons  1 119  995 532  463 
Log Likelihood  -2 849 -2 445 -1 247 -1 186 
        
1 ln; 2 ln of monthly net equivalent family income minus individual’s income. 
Note: Spouse abroad: N<3. Control variables not reported here are: Imputation Flags for Individual Labor Income and Family 
Labor Income. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses;  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Source:SOEP, 2001-2006, authors’ calculations. 
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background All  Migrants 
Age 0.189  0.307  0.257 
 (1.31)  (3.00)***  (3.19)*** 
Age Squared  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 
 (1.95)*  (3.27)***  (3.82)*** 
Gender (Female=1)  5.746  -0.029  1.445 
 (1.44)  (0.01)  (0.58) 
Marital Status (Married=1)  2.740  1.756  2.369 
 (2.71)***  (1.92)*  (3.55)*** 
Education (in Years)  0.412  0.510  0.393 
 (3.10)***  (3.89)***  (4.37)*** 
Monthly Individual Labour Income
1  0.554 0.310  0.466 
 (3.94)***  (2.35)**  (4.94)*** 
Monthly Net Equivalent Family Income
2  0.135 -0.068  0.047 
 (1.61)  (0.86)  (0.83) 
Householdsize in Germany  -0.843 -0.079  -0.421 
 (2.96)***  (0.37)  (2.50)** 
Relative Duration of Stay (Years in Germany/ Age)  -5.168 -10.801  -7.700 
 (2.70)***  (5.25)***  (6.00)*** 
Remigration Plans (yes=1)  0.653 2.406  0.882 
 (0.94)  (2.02)**  (1.60) 
Network Abroad    
      
(grand)Parents Abroad (yes=1)  1.236  2.497  1.567 
 (1.48)  (3.37)***  (3.01)*** 
Children Abroad (yes=1)  6.939  2.431  5.352 
 (6.03)***  (1.81)*  (6.36)*** 
Siblings Abroad (yes=1)  3.627  -0.398  1.348 
 (2.50)**  (0.36)  (1.62) 
Other Relatives Abroad (yes=1)  -0.744  -0.869  -0.894 
 (0.52)  (0.81)  (1.05) 
Friends Abroad (yes=1)  -0.192  2.285  1.785 
 (0.13)  (2.36)**  (2.24)** 
Interaction Term    
Age*Female -0.020  0.045  0.040 
 (0.43)  (1.13)  (1.39) 
Married*Female   0.494  0.233  -0.246 
 (0.33)  (0.19)  (0.27) 
Education*Female -0.084  -0.217  -0.105 
 (0.46)  (1.28)  (0.89) 
Individual Labor Income*Female  -0.008  -0.166  -0.148 
 (0.04)  (1.05)  (1.29) 
Family Income*Female  -0.062  0.160  0.049 
 (0.36)  (1.18)  (0.47) 
Householdsize*Female -0.214  -0.131  -0.111 
 (0.55)  (0.42)  (0.47) 
 






background All  Migrants 
Relative Duration of Stay*Female  -2986  2155  -0.951 
 (1.13)  (0.81)  (0.55) 
Remigration Plans*Female  -2.392  -1.493  -1.888 
 (2.39)**  (0.90)  (2.39)** 
(Grand)Parents Abroad*Female  -1.821  -0.429  -0.418 
 (1.58)  (0.42)  (0.59) 
Children Abroad*Female  -3.430  -1.857  -3.368 
 (1.98)**  (0.85)  (2.60)*** 
Siblings Abroad*Female  -4.376  3.081  -0.018 
 (1.97)**  (2.03)**  (0.01) 
Other Relatives Abroad*Female  1.042  0.272  0.364 
 (0.48)  (0.18)  (0.30) 
Friends Abroad*Female  -0.382  -0.529  -0.782 
 (0.20)  (0.38)  (0.70) 
Constant -16.394  -18.498  -17.378 
 (4.36)***  (6.15)***  (7.80)*** 
Observations  2 929 3 382 6 311 
Persons 732  995  1 648 
Log Likelihood  -2 061 -2 436 -4 533 
1 ln; 2 ln of monthly net equivalent family income minus individual’s income. 
Note: Spouse abroad: N<3. Control variables not reported here are Imputation Flags for Individual Labor Income 
and Family Labor Income. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses;  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Source:SOEP, 2001-2006, authors’ calculations   
 
  195 Conclusions 
 
The results presented show that gender-specific patterns of remittances exist. In addition, the 
study underlines the hypothesis that one important motivation of remittances might be the 
existence of transnational (family) networks. We have shown that female migrants tend to send 
support to their children first and foremost, while male migrants tend to support a wider network 
of more distant family members and friends. This finding is in sharp contrast to previous studies 
on remittances. It makes clear that there is little room for the assumption that remittances simply 
follow income-difference-based altruism or that women are more altruistic than men.  
The gender-specific differences in remittance behavior identified here might be due to gender-
specific migration patterns. However, they also might be due to the relative position of the 
migrant within the transnational network: in other words, whether or not the migrant is 
considered the major breadwinner for a broader range of family members living abroad.    
This study can be considered a first step in the analysis of remittances from the perspective of 
gender economics. The analysis of linkages between the structure of transnational networks and 
gender-specific remittance behavior also shows a potentially interesting direction for future 
research. One natural extension of this paper would be a deeper investigation of the social 
determinants of remittances, possibly linking the social networks literature to the economic 
literature on remittances. Such a study should analyze how the quality of the transnational 
network influences the decision to remit. In addition, deeper investigation of the potential gender-
specific motivations of migrants might be possible using the tools of experimental economics 
(Fehr/Fischbacher/Rosenbladt/Schupp/Wagner 2002).  
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